Introduction
As highlighted by Fuhrer and Moore (1995) , Fuhrer (2000) and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2001) amongst others, the popular micro-founded New Keynesian DSGE model with nominal price and wage staggering is not able to match the persistence and cross-correlations of the main macroeconomic time series (and in particular output and inflation) very well. In order to improve the empirical fit, a number of additional features that introduce structural persistence in the basic building blocks (price and wage setting and consumption and investment decisions) of those models have been introduced. 1 These features typically result in the introduction of lagged endogenous variables in the various Euler equations.
However, the importance of those backward-looking components has been subject to a heated debate both on its theoretical foundations and on its empirical importance. From a theoretical point of view, it is not always clear what the "micro-foundations" are of the structural persistence in inflation, wage, consumption and investment equations. While references are often made to generalised adjustment costs, the micro-economic evidence of the exact form of these adjustment costs is scant. Alternative explanations refer to rule-of-thumb behaviour, formal or informal indexation and habit formation.
However, also here the evidence is not always clear cut. 2 From an empirical perspective there is a debate about the importance of forward-looking behaviour in inflation, wages, consumption and investment. For example, while some authors claim that the inflation process is dominated by backward-looking components (e.g. Fuhrer, 1997) , others have found that inflation follows a primarily forward-looking process (e.g. Galí and Gertler, 1999) . A review of some of the evidence for the United States can be found in Rudebusch (2002) . Similarly, while Cogley and Sargent (2001) have argued that there has been a downward shift in the degree of persistence in the inflation process in the US suggesting that inflation persistence is not necessarily structural, others (see Stock, 2001 ) have countered that the statistical evidence in favour of such a break is weak.
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The degree of structural persistence in the process for inflation and output has potentially important implications for optimal monetary policy. A number of authors have examined the robustness of policy with respect to the degree of inflation persistence. However, also here there does not seem to be a consensus regarding the implications. For example, Amato and Laubach (2002) conclude that the optimal policy rule under commitment in the benchmark forward-looking model performs also quite well in more backward-looking models. This finding is corroborated by Giannoni and Woodford (2002a,b) , who show that introducing inflation persistence in the standard New Keynesian model introduces forward-looking elements in the optimal policy rule. However, the weights on these forward-looking elements are quite small. In contrast, Coenen (2002) , who focuses on simple instrument rules, finds that it is better for the 1 See, for example, Galí and Gertler (1999) , Christiano et al. (2001) , Amato and Laubach (2002) and Smets and Wouters (2003) .
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For example, Amato and Laubach (2002) refer to micro-economic studies of consumption behaviour to argue in favour of rule-of-thumb behaviour in consumption rather than habit formation.
3
See also the cross-country evidence presented in Benati (2002) and Levin and Piger (2002) .
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7 monetary policy maker to assume that the economy is characterised by a relatively high degree of persistence because the costs of making a mistake when the economy in reality is less persistent are not as high as making the reverse mistake.
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In this paper, we revisit this issue using the DSGE model estimated for the euro area in Smets and
Wouters (2003) looking not only at nominal persistence, but also at real persistence. The model used incorporates various structural persistence mechanisms such as price and wage indexation, habit formation in consumption and adjustment costs in investment. In order to illustrate the differences between nominal and real persistence we concentrate on the implications of inflation persistence due to price indexation on the one hand, and of output persistence due to adjustment costs in investment on the other hand. The main features of the Smets-Wouters model are described in Section 2. We then proceed in three steps. In Section 3, we first analyse the effects of different degrees of persistence on the dynamics of the economy. We investigate the implications of structural nominal and real persistence for the monetary policy transmission mechanism and the transmission of various structural shocks. Next, in
Section 4 we use a standard welfare criterion in inflation, the output gap and changes in interest rates, to analyse the effects of structural persistence on optimal monetary policy. This is done by looking at the efficiency frontiers and the optimal response of policy under commitment to the various shocks. Finally, in Section 5 we examine the robustness of policy in the presence of uncertainty about the degree of structural persistence, looking again at both simple policy rules and optimal policy under commitment.
The Smets-Wouters euro area (SWEAR) model
In this section we briefly describe the estimated model for the euro area that we will use in the subsequent analysis. 5 The model is an extended version of the standard New-Keynesian DSGE closed-economy model with sticky prices and wages as, for example, analysed in Erceg et al. (2001) . Households maximise a utility function with two arguments (goods and leisure) over an infinite life horizon.
Consumption appears in the utility function relative to a time-varying external habit variable. 6 Labour is differentiated over households, so that there is some monopoly power over wages which results in an explicit wage equation and allows for the introduction of sticky nominal wages à la Calvo (see Calvo, 1983) . Households also rent capital services to firms and decide how much capital to accumulate given certain capital adjustment costs. As the rental price of capital goes up, the capital stock can be used more intensively according to some cost schedule. Firms produce differentiated goods, decide on labour and capital inputs, and set prices, again according to the Calvo model. The Calvo model in both wage and price setting is augmented by the assumption that those prices and wages that can not be freely set are partially indexed to past prices. Prices are therefore set as a function of current and expected marginal 4 Coenen (2002) also analyses the cost of using inflation forecasts based on models with the wrong degree of inflation persistence.
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A more complete derivation and description can be found in Smets and Wouters (2003) .
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Habit depends on lagged aggregate consumption which is unaffected by any one agent's decisions. Abel (1990) The corresponding Q equation is given by:
, t is the rate of depreciation and k r is the steady-state rental rate on capital.
The current value of the capital stock depends negatively on the ex-ante real interest rate, and positively on its expected future value and the expected rental rate. The introduction of a shock to the required rate 7 
where t L is labour. The real wage, t w , is a function of expected and past real wages and the expected, current and past inflation rate where the relative weight depends on the degree of indexation of the nonoptimised wages. When 0 = w g , real wages do not depend on the lagged inflation rate. There is a negative effect of the deviation of the actual real wage from the wage that would prevail in a flexible labour market. The size of this effect will be greater, the smaller the degree of wage rigidity ( w ), the lower the demand elasticity for labour ( w l ) and the lower the inverse elasticity of labour supply ( L s ) (the flatter the labour supply curve).
L t e is a persistent labour supply shock, while w t h is a temporary wage mark-up shock.
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This is the only shock that is not directly related to the structure of the economy. For alternative interpretations of this equity premium shock and an analysis of optimal monetary policy in the presence of such shocks, see Dupor (2001).
The equalisation of marginal cost implies that, for a given installed capital stock, labour demand depends negatively on the real wage (with a unit elasticity) and positively on the rental rate of capital:
is last period's capital stock and y is the inverse of the elasticity of the capital utilisation cost function.
The goods market equilibrium condition can be written as:
where y k is the steady state capital-output ratio, y g the steady-state government spending-output ratio and f is one plus the share of the fixed cost in production.
G t e captures a government spending shock.
Finally, the model is closed by adding the following empirical monetary policy reaction function:
The monetary policy-makers gradually respond to deviations of lagged inflation from a time-varying inflation objective ( t p ) and to the output gap, defined as the difference between actual and potential output ( p t Y ). Consistent with the DSGE model, potential output is defined as the level of output that would prevail under flexible prices and wages in the absence of the three "cost-push" shocks: h . The parameter r captures the degree of interest rate smoothing. In addition, there is also a short-run feedback from the current change in inflation and the output gap. Finally, in addition to the persistent time-varying inflation objective, we also assume that there is a temporary interest rate shock ( R t h ), which will also be denoted as a monetary policy shock.
Equations (1) to (9) determine the nine endogenous variables: p t , t w , The first set of shock variables is assumed to follow independent first-order autoregressive processes, whereas the second set is assumed to be IID independent processes. The estimated autoregressive parameters and standard deviations of these shocks are reported in Table A of the Appendix.
The two parameters that are of particular interest in this paper are p g and I h , capturing the structural persistence in the inflation and in the investment process respectively. In addition, we will also use a flexible price and wage version of the DSGE model in order to define a model-consistent output gap. In what follows, the output gap is defined as the difference between the actual level of output under sticky prices and wages and the level of output that would prevail under flexible prices and wages in the absence of distortionary equitypremium, price and wage mark-up shocks. 
Nominal and real persistence and the propagation of shocks
In this section we analyse the implications of changes in inflation and investment persistence for the propagation of various shocks in the estimated euro area model discussed above. Charts 1 and 2 illustrate how the economy responds to a monetary policy shock under various degrees of nominal and real persistence when the monetary authorities follow the estimated policy rule. In each case, the persistence parameter takes three values: a low value of 0.1, a medium value of 0.5 and a high value of 0.9.
A number of observations are worth making. As expected, higher inflation persistence amplifies and prolongs the output and inflation effects of a monetary policy shock. It clearly delays the peak effect of a policy shock on inflation, thereby producing a more pronounced hump-shaped response in inflation. It also implies a larger peak effect of the policy shock on inflation (Chart 1). The effects of higher inflation persistence on the response of the output gap are smaller: while the size of the peak effect on output increases somewhat, the timing of the peak effect does not change very much. 10 Higher inflation persistence also implies a much more persistent real interest rate response.
In contrast, the effects of higher output persistence (as captured by a higher degree of investment persistence) on the response of the output gap and inflation are much less pronounced (Chart 2). Higher investment persistence delays the peak effect of a policy shock on output, but it does not appear to affect the peak effect on inflation. Those peak effects increase somewhat (in absolute value) as the persistence in investment increases, but the size of those effects is much smaller than in the case of higher inflation persistence.
These results are confirmed in Table 1 , which reports the maximum size (and its timing in quarters following the shock) of the effect of the various other shocks on inflation and the output gap. Higher inflation persistence increases and delays the maximum response of inflation to the various shocks. As a result, the output gap generally also responds more, but the timing of its peak is not much affected.
Consistent with the results for a monetary policy shock, higher output persistence generally delays the maximum response of the output gap to the various shocks, but has little effect on the timing of the peak response in inflation which is governed by the degree of inflation persistence. There is no clear effect on the size of output gap and inflation responses. The relatively limited size effects of higher investment persistence may be due to the fact that the share of investment in total output is relatively small and consumption is not very much affected by shifts in the response of investment.
Structural persistence and optimal monetary policy
In order to analyse the effects of structural persistence on optimal monetary policy, we use the following standard quadratic loss function in deviations of inflation from a zero inflation target, the output gap and changes in the nominal interest rate:
While this loss function does not necessarily fully capture the welfare of the representative consumer in the estimated DSGE model, it is likely to be a close approximation for two reasons. First, the output gap concept used in the loss function is consistent with the underlying structure of the model. Potential output is defined as the output level that would prevail under flexible prices and wages in the absence of the distortionary equity premium and price and wage mark-up shocks. As shown by Woodford (2001) , in a simple version of the estimated model, optimal policy can be characterised as closing the output gap defined as such. Second, nominal price staggering creates costs of inflation, which can be captured by the term in inflation. While it is true that this term may be modified when there is price and wage indexation and when also nominal wages are rigid, the dominant weight will still be on inflation variability in both cases.
11 Finally, the term in interest rate changes is mainly introduced to avoid extreme and counterfactual interest rate volatility under the optimal policies. Various arguments such as a desire to avoid hitting the lower zero bound or financial stability considerations could be used to justify a concern for interest rate volatility. As a benchmark we will assume equal weights on output gap and inflation variability ( 5 . 0 1 = l ) and a relatively small weight ( 1 . 0 2 = l ) on changes in interest rates.
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Charts 3 and 4 show how the efficiency frontier shifts when the inflation and investment persistence parameters shift from a low to a high value. In each case we calculate two efficiency frontiers. The first one is derived by optimising the loss function for various relative weights on inflation and the output gap under the assumption that the central bank follows a simple Taylor-type rule with interest rate smoothing.
The second one is derived under the assumption that the central bank implements the fully optimal commitment rule that maximises loss function (10). Not surprisingly, the efficiency frontier under the fully optimal commitment rule lies closer to the origin than the one under a simple Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing. The loss associated with constraining the central bank to follow a simple policy rule is, however, generally not very large.
Focusing on how the efficiency frontiers shift as nominal and real persistence increases, two features are worth highlighting. First, not surprisingly given the results in Section 3, the efficiency frontiers shift out most in the case of increasing inflation persistence (Chart 3). The outward shift due to higher investment persistence is very limited (Chart 4). From a macro-economic stabilisation point of view, nominal persistence therefore appears to be much more costly than real persistence. Second, the slope of the efficiency frontier becomes flatter with increasing inflation persistence, while it tends to become steeper with increasing output persistence. The policy implications of a change in the degree of persistence can be most easily seen by looking at the impact of higher persistence on the optimised coefficients in the Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing reported in Table 2 . Higher inflation persistence increases the optimised reaction coefficient to inflation from a relatively small number of 0.07 to a more significant number of 0.47, while the coefficient on the output gap falls from 0.51 to 0.33. The intuition for this result is quite straightforward: as the inflation process becomes harder to control it becomes more important for the central bank to respond promptly to increases in inflation. In contrast, the opposite happens when the degree of output persistence increases: the reaction coefficient to inflation falls from 0.23 to 0.18, while the coefficient on the output gap increases from 0.40 to 0.47.
A common feature of all the optimised Taylor rules reported in Table 2 is the substantial degree of interest rate smoothing. In all cases, the coefficient on the lagged interest rate hovers around one, typically being somewhat larger than one. This is in line with Woodford's (2001) The fully optimal commitment rule is more difficult to interpret as it is a much more complicated function of the underlying state of the economy. In order to get a better sense of the difference between the various policy rules, Charts 5 to 8 plot the optimal nominal and real interest rate response to a selected set of shocks under the policy rule estimated in the Smets-Wouters model (equation (9)), the optimised Taylor rule and the fully optimal commitment rule. The most striking result is that, with the exception of the cost-push shock, the historically estimated interest rate response to the various supply and demand shocks is always much smaller than those under the optimal policies. As a result the output gap and inflation respond much stronger to the various shocks, explaining the overall higher volatility under the estimated rule compared to the optimal policies. The most striking example is given in Chart 6, which depicts the response to a preference shock. While the impact effect on the nominal interest rate is quite similar in all cases, the interest rate response is much more hump-shaped under the optimal policies. This helps in closing the output gap and stabilising inflation. A second common finding is that in general the interest rate response under the optimised Taylor rule is quite close to the response under the fully optimal commitment rule.
By way of example, Charts 9 to 12 compare the optimal policy response under commitment to a productivity shock and to a price mark-up shock under different degrees of inflation persistence (Charts 9 and 11) and investment persistence (Charts 10 and 12). illustrates that higher inflation persistence does lead to a higher output cost of stabilising inflation following a price mark-up shock.
Persistence and robust monetary policy
Finally, given the conceptual and empirical uncertainty regarding the structural persistence parameters highlighted in the introduction, in this section we examine robust monetary policy in the face of such uncertainty. Tables 3 and 4 )), our analysis also allows for the intermediate cases. We find that, if the policy maker wants to minimise the maximum regret, he or she should assume a degree of inflation persistence equal to 0.8. Under this policy, the maximum opportunity loss is quite small. It will only be 2.6 percent higher than under the optimal policy, which would assume a much more forward-looking inflation process. In this case, also the mean opportunity loss will only be 1.4 percent.
14 In contrast, implementing policies that assume a highly forward-looking Phillips curve may result in much higher relative losses (15.6 percent) when in reality inflation turns out to be significantly backward looking.
Second, uncertainty about investment persistence does not appear to be problematic from a robustness point of view. None of the rules gives rise to very large losses, which is not very surprising given the findings in Sections 3 and 4.
13 That is, the one the central bank would implement if it knew the true degree of persistence.
14 As shown in Table 3 , the mean opportunity loss could be further reduced to 0.9 percent by assuming that the degree of inflation persistence is somewhat lower at 0.7. However, in this case, the maximum opportunity loss is somewhat higher (3.3 percent).
Finally, the robustness exercise regarding the optimal commitment policies (Table 4) shows that those policies are generally more robust than the simple Taylor-type policy rules, confirming Svensson's (2002) conjecture that targeting rules are more robust. The relative robustness of optimal commitment rules can potentially also explain why Amato and Laubach (2002) and Giannoni and Woodford (2002b) find that optimal policies derived in a simple forward-looking New-Keynesian model also work reasonably well in the more backward-looking versions of that model.
Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed the implications of structural inflation and output persistence for the transmission of shocks and for optimal monetary policy in an estimated DSGE model of the euro area.
Given the uncertainty regarding both the conceptual underpinnings and the empirical importance of structural persistence in inflation and output, our ultimate focus was to analyse the robustness of various monetary policies in the face of this uncertainty. Our main findings in this regard are as follows. First, we find that uncertainty about the degree of output persistence presents much smaller problems for monetary policy-makers than uncertainty about the degree of inflation persistence. In particular, it is found that optimal monetary policies appear to be less sensitive to different degrees of output persistence. By contrast, when there is uncertainty about the degree of inflation persistence, we find that it is better for policy-makers to work under the assumption that the economy is characterised by a relatively high degree of inflation persistence because the costs of making a mistake when the inflation process in reality is less persistent are not as high as making the reverse mistake. This finding confirms the results in Coenen (2002). Second, while a similar tendency is found for optimised simple rules and optimal commitment policies, we find that the latter are generally more robust than the former. It would be interesting to analyse what feature of these policies makes them more robust. For this it would be necessary to characterise the optimal policy rules under commitment more explicitly, such as proposed by Giannoni and Woodford (2002a,b) . We leave this for future research.
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Chart 1 Note: The model parameters used in this paper correspond to the mode of their posterior distribution (column 4). The SWEAR model is estimated using Bayesian techniques. The first three columns report the assumed prior distributions for each of the parameters. Columns 4 and 5 report the mode and a proximate standard error of the posterior distribution. The last four columns report the 5, 50 and 95 percentiles and the mean of the posterior distribution sampled using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. See Smets and Wouters (2003) for further details. Note: Each entry gives the peak effect (in absolute value) of the various (one standard deviation) shocks on inflation and the output gap. The number below indicates the timing of the peak effect (in quarters following the shock). Low, medium and high persistence refers to a parameter value of respectively 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9. Note: The numbers refer to the optimal reaction coefficients to current inflation, the output gap and the lagged interest rate in a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing. Note: The optimised simple rule is a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing. A "*" refers to the minimum of the maximum (mean) regret. Note: A "*" refers to the minimum of the maximum (mean) regret.
